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RETHINKING RED LIGHTS:
AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO APPALACHIAN
PROSTITUTION LAWS
Kandi Spindler
I.

INTRODUCTION

Poolside at a Las Vegas hotel, a difficult interview
commences with S. 1 She is distractingly funny, and conversation
drifts from television shows to fast food. She does a hilarious
impersonation of the way her toddler, confined to a walker, clumsily
grasps for out-of-reach pizza on the kitchen table. Remembering the
purpose of this interview is a struggle, but a single question offers
quick redirection: “So what skill best serves you as a prostitute?”2
The answer is not what you would expect. “I’m a people
person,” she says, smiling. 3 “You need to be a people person.
Prostitutes are counselors, really.”4 Sex is only a small piece of her
work, she explains; she sells an experience. 5 A successful sex
worker uses her “people person” skills to figure out why each client

1

Several interviewees requested to stay anonymous. Interview with S., in Las
Vegas, Nev. (July 18, 2015).
2
The Author respectfully acknowledges that some members of the
profession, as well as some advocacy groups, prefer the term “sex worker.”
Yet the law still refers to sex work as prostitution, making it necessary to use
“prostitute” and “sex worker” interchangeably. Additionally, this Note does
not attempt to sanitize the words of interviewees who self-identified as
prostitutes without shame. Finally, while sex workers encompass a broad
range of gender identities and sexualities, this Note focused on cisgendered
women who serviced predominately male clients. The Author encourages
further study on the subject of gender and prostitution.
3
Interview with S., supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
Id.
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needs that specific experience.6
Take, for example, the client wishing to briefly live the
Vegas fantasy. S. plans a weekend of chic dinners, gambling, and
parties at the big-name casinos.7 This client wants to feel important,
so a public appearance with a beautiful woman is key. 8 At the
opposite end of the spectrum is the heartbreaking lonely client who
just wants some human interaction.9
S. just taught you Prostitution Economics 101—prostitution
is a unique service that meets a specialized need that is physical,
psychological, or both. Either way, the provision of services to this
need falls squarely within the supply and demand structure of
American capitalism.10 This economic outlook is not unique to S.;
Nevada’s legal brothels likewise fulfill a market demand through
this same, straightforward provision of surprisingly heartwarming
services. The manager and assistant manager of Bella’s Hacienda
Ranch in Wells, Nevada—a mother-daughter team—described a
slew of clients for whom prostitution is an irreplaceable industry.11
There’s the man who is, after fifty years of marriage, suddenly a
widower.12 For him, finding another partner is out of the question—
but so is a one-night-stand.13 At Bella’s, he finds the right amount
of companionship to keep going. 14 Other clients include crossdressers whose sexual preferences are unaccepted in general
6

Id.
Id.
8
Interview with S., in Las Vegas, Nev. (July 18, 2015).
9
Id.
10
XAVIERA HOLLANDER, THE HAPPY HOOKER 157 (1972) (“In other words,
it’s a supply situation strictly catering to demand. And as long as there is such
a thing as male libido, the ostrich-attitude law notwithstanding, there will
always be a demand for a high-class brothel.”). See also Marina Della Guista
et al., Who is Watching? The Market for Prostitution Services, 22 J. OF
POPULATION ECON. 501 (2009) (presenting economic models for prostitution
from both the supply perspective of prostitutes and demand side of clients).
11
Interview with Lisa and Kelly, Manager and Assistant Manager, Bella’s
Hacienda Ranch, in Wells, Nev. (July 21, 2015) [hereinafter interview at
Bella’s Hacienda].
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
7

SPINDLER: RETHINKING RED LIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO APPALACHIAN PROSTITUTION LAWS

68

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

society.15 Some suffer from disabilities, like birth defects or, in the
case of many veterans, amputations, that sex workers accommodate
without judgment.16
Despite prostitution’s clear role in supply and demand,
economics is strangely ignored as society begins to seriously
consider legal prostitution. As one sex worker wisely noted, “while
every interviewer asks me whether I was sexually abused as a child,
none of them have ever asked me a single question about the
financial mindset, or even the financial motivation, involved in my
decision to work in the sex industry.” 17 Economics are
overshadowed by the belief that no one voluntarily sells sex—or
that those who do lack the capacity to make smart budgetary or
moral choices. 18 However, disregarding economics insults
prostitutes by adhering to the “where did you go wrong?” inquiry;
studies that fail to consider economics also defy logic by insisting
that sex work is not, at its core, about money.19
An economic outlook on prostitution is not devoid of
humanity if one remembers that “[e]conomics is the study of
decision-making” based on the assumption “that people are
fundamentally rational beings who chose among the available
options the things that make them better off . . . and avoid options
that do not.” 20 Accordingly, economics understands prostitution
15

Id.
Interview at Bella’s Hacienda, supra note 11.
17
Jo Weldon, Show Me the Money: A Sex Worker Reflects on Research Into
the Sex Industry, 9 RESEARCH FOR SEX WORK: SEX WORK AND MONEY,
2006, at 12, http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/research-for-sexwork-9-english.pdf.
18
In fact, S. defies the stereotype of a money-strapped prostitute. “I’ve always
been a business woman,” she says. She had early business experience through
her father’s roofing business, but claims that earning an income through
prostitution is “not that complicated, it’s just budgeting. And if you can’t do
that as a sex worker, you can’t do that as any kind of worker.” Interview with
S., supra note 1.
19
Weldon, supra note 17, at 13.
20
Alys Willman-Navarro, What Economics Should Be Doing for Sex Work
Research, 9 RESEARCH FOR SEX WORK: SEX WORK AND MONEY, 2006, at
19,
http://www.nswp.org/sites/nswp.org/files/research-for-sex-work-9english.pdf.
16
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better than morality because economics examines how the behavior
of clients and sex workers turns into capital. No matter the purpose
of addressing prostitution, it simply makes sense to know what is
actually going on, as prostitution cannot respond to laws that draw
on irrelevant factors. As one researcher put it: “Money is power, and
power defines the rules of any game.” 21 Economics truthfully
reports on prostitution by examining the actual incentives that keep
prostitution running. 22 As such, economics is a more accurate
platform for legal reform. 23 When prostitution laws draw on the
local economy, real acts by real people are considered, rather than
moral supposition about what prostitution must be like.
Accepting the role of economics in prostitution
acknowledges that a sex worker’s daily concern is how to make a
living. “[U]ntil we acknowledge the unique economic need sex
work fulfills, and acknowledge money as a motivation for working
in the sex industry, there can be no useful approach to solve any of
the problems in or around the sex industry.”24 “[P]olitical and social
aspirations” that ignore financial incentive exist more for the benefit
of smug academics and policy-makers than actual prostitutes. 25
Even well-meaning ideologues harm prostitutes through a “‘topdown’ approach” in which laws and policies “fail to account for
local conditions” because the enacting individuals are too removed
to know what those conditions are.26
The gap between the reality of prostitution and the law

21

Id. at 20.
Id. at 19 (“[M]oral issues aside, participants in illicit markets respond to
incentives and disincentives and run their operations in ways very similar to
formal businesses, and very often overlap with the private sector.”).
23
Laura Agustín, Sex and the Limits of Enlightenment: The Irrationality of
Legal Regimes to Control Prostitution, 5 Sexuality Res. & Soc. Pol’y 73, 751
(2008) (arguing that moral and ethical incentives for regulating prostitution
will always yield different proposals, thus “[i]f progress is to be judged as
social improvement for the people who sell sex and the neighborhoods where
it is sold, governance remains chaotic.”).
24
Weldon, supra note 17, at 13.
25
Jane Scoular, What’s Law Got to Do with It? How and Why Law Matters
in the Regulation of Sex Work, 37 J. OF L & SOC’Y 12, 13 (Mar. 2010).
26
Id.
22
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becomes even more troubling in rural areas, such as Appalachia.27
A distant state capitol does not see rural women’s struggle to
financially survive, thus law regulates prostitution without
understanding how sex workers benefit. In Appalachia,
“‘everything necessary for a good life is scarce’ . . . including jobs,
housing, clothing and transportation . . . [and] depressed conditions
in rural Appalachia create tensions, resulting in minimal civic
activity.” 28 Low-density populations can further prevent the
financial success of rural women by hindering large-scale economic
development and educational opportunities.29 Thus an Appalachian
woman has more incentive to sell sex for an otherwise impossible
income. She lives in a world beyond the contemplation of
lawmakers. 30 Against the top-down legislative approach that
ignores Appalachian struggle, this Note rests on the principle that
better laws come from the people.
27

Appalachia is a cultural and geographic region that runs along the
mountains for which it is named. For some, “Appalachia represents
quintessential . . . Mention of the region evokes images of uneducated white
people living in acute poverty. In fact, some of the most extreme examples of
the hardships, challenges, and vulnerabilities associated with rural living are
found in Appalachia.” Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters: Domestic Violence and
Rural Differences, 23 WIS. J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 347, 394 (2008). However,
Appalachia also represents a rich cultural heritage that rightfully brims with
pride over its historical and industrial accomplishments. As Appalachians
struggle to overcome the economic hardships brought forth by the twilight of
the coal industry, they demonstrate amazing resiliance and optimism for their
home. See Sarah Baird, Stereotypes of Appalachia Obscure a Diverse Picture,
WBUR
NEWS
(Apr.
6,
2014),
http://www.wbur.org/npr/298892382/stereotypes-of-appalachia-obscure-adiverse-picture.
28
Pruitt, supra note 27, at 372 (quoting Cynthia M. Duncan, Persistent
Poverty in Appalachia: Scarce Work and Rigid Stratification, in Rural
Poverty In America 112, 131 (Cynthia M. Duncan ed., 1992)).
29
Pruitt, supra note 27, at 372.
30
Agustín, supra note 23, at 76. (“When legal projects reduce the object by
setting parameters around prostitution only . . . [a] proponent plan excludes
the messy complexities and ambiguities from the subject . . . mak[ing] the
plan appear reasonable.”). But see Scoular, supra note 25, at 25 (asserting
that Agustín uses an overly-simplified notion “of law as a free-floating entity,
with society going on outside of it.”).

DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.

2017]

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & L.

VOLUME 6, NUMBER II

71

Accordingly, this Note evaluates prostitution laws through a
firsthand study of rural prostitution. This study considers two
counties: McDowell County, West Virginia and Elko County,
Nevada. McDowell County illustrates how criminal laws have
failed, and continue to fail, at regulating Appalachian prostitution,
whereas Nevada—a state where all legal prostitution is confined to
about nineteen brothels in the rural outskirts—is well suited for
considering what legal prostitution could look like in Appalachia.31
However, Appalachia should not adopt Nevada’s prostitution laws
merely because that adoption is feasible. Instead, this Note looks to
Nevada as the sole American example of legal rural prostitution.32
Part II examines the flaws in both West Virginia’s criminal
prostitution laws and Nevada’s laws governing legal brothels. Part
III then proposes a solution for effective rural prostitution regulation
through a new American model for legal prostitution that allows
corporate access to rural areas in the form of a parent-subsidiary
structure. The ultimate goal of this model is realistic laws that
31

Contrary to popular belief, prostitution is not legal in Las Vegas; state law
specifically seeks to exclude prostitution from large cities. Any county that
may legally grant a license for the operation of a brothel, which is the only
form in which legal prostitution may occur, must have a population of
700,000 or less. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345(8)(West 2015). As of 2015,
the number of reported legal brothels is 19, but the businesses open and close
with frequency. Daniel Hernandez, Survival of the Freakiest: How Some of
Nevada’s Brothels Are Staying Afloat, THE GUARDIAN (June 2, 2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/jun/02/nevada-brothels-sherisranch.
32
Advocates of legal prostitution frequently idealize European models of
legal prostitution in comparison to America’s criminal approach, but an
extensive overview of prostitution laws in Nordic countries admits that “[i]t
is difficult to say anything conclusive about the relationship between
prostitution law and the size and composition of the prostitution market.”
May-Len Skilbrei & Charlotta Holmström, Is there a Nordic Prostitution
Regime?, 40 CRIME & JUST. 479, 499 (2011). Furthermore, international
comparisons of “[m]odels of prostitution policy often disguise differences” in
markets. Id. at 507. Accordingly, Nevada is a better basis for comparison to
Appalachian prostitution policy as another largely rural American state.
European models cater to high-density populations in small areas, thus
comparing them to America is problematic and furthers the exclusion of rural
prostitutes.
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balance state interest in controlling prostitution with a fair and
indispensable income for rural women.
II.

LEGAL PRACTICALITY: WHY PROSTITUTION LAWS
FOCUS ON THE WRONG FACTORS

If prostitution is about capital, why do American legal
repercussions for prostitution focus on property? When prostitution
is allowed, county lines, population, and land use mark its
boundaries. 33 When prostitution is criminalized, the law targets
location. 34 When prostitution is punished, property restrictions
apply. In both West Virginia and Nevada, prostitution constitutes a
nuisance that can result in injunction. 35 In fact, the state of West
Virginia itself can bring a suit in equity “to abate such nuisance and
33

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 244.345(8); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.380.
The West Virginia criminal provision on prostitution begins by explaining
who is culpable based on association with “any house, place, building, hotel,
tourist camp, other structure, or part thereof, or vehicle, trailer, or other
conveyance [used] for the purpose of prostitution.” W. VA. CODE ANN. § 618-5(a)(West 2016). This association can take the form of keeping, setting up,
maintaining, operating, owning, leasing, subletting, renting, directing, taking,
transporting, or inviting someone into a house of ill fame. § 61-8-5(a). In
keeping with property-centrism, “the reputation or character of any house,
place, building, hotel, tourist camp, or other structure” is admissible for a
prostitution charge. § 61-8-5(c). Nevada has a similar provision regarding the
admissibility of the reputation of “any house alleged to be so kept.” NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 201.400 (West 2015). Yet Nevada law at least
defines prostitution. § 201.295. While West Virginian law undergoes an
exhaustive description of where prostitution can happen, no definition for
prostitution exists. Conversely, nuisance is defined by prostitution, meaning
prostitution is best understood to West Virginian law through property. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 61-9-1 (“‘[N]uisance’ shall mean any place . . . upon which
lewdness, assignation, or prostitution is conducted.”).
35
In West Virginia, a nuisance based on prostitution enjoins the “the owner,
agent, or lessee of any interest in any such nuisance, together with the person
employed in or in control of any such nuisance . . . .” W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 61-9-2. Nevada likewise specifies that “[t]he maintenance and operation of
[a] house of prostitution . . . being a nuisance under the common law and
being within the definition of a nuisance . . . [is] properly enjoined and
restrained by the district court.” Cunningham v. Washoe Cnty., 203 P.2d 611,
613 (Nev. 1949).
34

DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.

2017]

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & L.

VOLUME 6, NUMBER II

73

to perpetually enjoin” prostitution.36 Furthermore, a West Virginian
prostitution charge voids a defendant’s lease, including those at
tourist camps, or in “any temporary or permanent buildings, tents,
cabins, or structures, or trailers, or other vehicles.” 37 Such laws
showcase the faulty logic that, if prostitution ceases on a certain
piece of property, it disappears altogether.
Legislating as though prostitution depends on location is a
legal fiction because property control does not equate to prostitution
control. Furthermore, property-centric laws are irrelevant to real
world prostitution because they build on two large misconceptions.
First, using property as a conduit for regulation is flawed because
prostitution is transitory while property is inherently unmovable.
Second, by assuming that the property owner exercises complete
authority, the law misdirects its force at the wrong individuals.
Resolving these misconceptions through economics redirects legal
focus to the role of human beings.
A. Transience of Prostitution
In defense of state laws, one could argue that using property
to regulate prostitution made more sense before the American
transportation boom facilitated movement through rural areas.
However, these laws lacked effect in Appalachia long before
highways and the Internet. As early as 1911, the red-light district of
Cinder Bottom in McDowell, West Virginia was “infamous . . . as
the ‘International Whorehouse District of the Coal Fields’…[i]n
addition to American’s white and Negro prostitutes, their likes are
here from nearly every country in Europe.”38 The diversity among
Cinder Bottom prostitutes shows that travelling from outside West
Virginia to Cinder Bottom did not deter them from making good
money from sex work. Yet despite the fact that Cinder Bottom
prostitutes were primarily outsiders, the law treated brothels as the

36

W. VA. CODE ANN. art. 9 § 61-9-3.
W. VA. CODE ANN. art. 8 § 61-8-5(c).
38
HOWARD B. LEE, BLOODLETTING IN APPALACHIA app. III 203 (W. Va.
Univ. 1969).
37
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origin of control.39 Indictments did not charge women for selling
sex. 40 Rather, punishment centered around living, loitering, or
boarding in a “house of ill fame.”41
Early twentieth century West Virginian law saw the root of
prostitution as the place of prostitution, an association that carries
over into today’s state laws.42 In Las Vegas, S. explained that she
was “eighty-sixed” (slang for banned) when caught illegally
working at casinos.43 This punishment stems from trespass law,44
and there is even a specific Nevada law titled “[u]nlawful trespass
upon licensed gaming establishment by person previously convicted
of prostitution or solicitation for prostitution.”45 In practice, the ban
applies to the individual hotel or casino, so being eight-sixed only
excludes work at that specific establishment. 46 Enforcement
therefore depends on hotel employees recognizing individual sex
workers, which leaves ample work opportunity in Las Vegas’ many
other resorts.47 This regulation is doubly ineffective because a new
charge for prostitution generally requires trespassing within six
39

A combination of prostitution indictments and census information reveals
the residents of several brothels existing in 1910 and confirms that prostitutes
came from outside West Virginia to work in Cinder Bottom. For example, a
brothel headed by Mary Dickenson had seventeen female residents in 1910,
but only three state natives. DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1910
POPULATION, CENSUS PLACE: BROWNS CREEK, MCDOWELL, WEST
VIRGINIA 9B. Eleven hailed from Virginia, two from Kentucky and one from
Georgia. Id. Similarly, Ella Kelso’s boardinghouse of eight women contained
no West Virginians; half came from Virginia, two from Tennessee and the
remaining from North Carolina and Pennsylvania. Id.
40
In researching Cinder Bottom prostitution, the Author reviewed hundreds
of McDowell County prostitution indictments that all contained this language,
a sample of which is provided by the charges cited in this Note. Infra note 50.
41
Id.
42
See supra notes 32–36.
43
Interview with S., supra note 1.
44
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.200.
45
§ 207.203.
46
S. even contends that she has a friend that was “eighty-sixed” from the
entire strip as a whole, which may be a more realistic portrayal of how
enforcement realistically manifests. Interview with S., supra note 1.
47
Interview with S., supra note 1.
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months; if a prostitute trespasses on a prohibited location after one
year, police just re-issue the ban.48 Clearly, property-based criminal
law does not deter prostitution, and the transient nature of
prostitution explains why.
1. Transience of Sex Workers
Prostitution is a mobile industry that follows activity and
demand.49 To satisfy this demand, sex workers create an interactive
network that centers on people and work availability—not property.
This has been true in Appalachia since the heyday of Cinder
Bottom,50 and transience shapes prostitution today just as it did in
48

A Las Vegas law firm confirms S.’s portrayal of regulation: “[i]n practice,
the Clark County D.A. typically does not press trespass charges stemming
from bans more than one year old.” Guide to “Trespass” Laws in Nev. (N.R.S.
207.200) (Explained by Las Vegas Criminal Defense Lawyers), LAS VEGAS
DEF. GRP., http://www.shouselaw.com/nevada/trespass.html (last visited Oct.
25, 2015).
49
More Bang for Your Buck: How New Tech. is Shaking Up the Oldest
Business,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Aug.
9,
2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21611074-how-new-technologyshaking-up-oldest-business-more-bang-your-buck (noting that prostitution
advertisement raised considerably when political conventions hit Denver and
Minneapolis in 2008). The correlation between prostitution and gatherings
and conventions applies in Appalachia as well. Taylor Eaton, Update:
Charleston Police Cracking Down on Online Prostitution, WSAC NEWS
CHANNEL
(Feb.
3,
2015,
11:50
PM),
http://www.wsaz.com/home/headlines/Six-Arrested-During-ProstitutionSting-in-Charleston--291849181.html (citing a Lieutenant statement that,
“"Whenever there's a large gathering, like . . . the Legislature being in
session . . . [a]ccording to the prostitutes on the street, there tends to be a rise
in their business . . .”).
50
The network of the aforementioned Mary Dickerson illustrates why the
transience of Cinder Bottom prostitutes defied property regulations.
Dickerson faced charges in 1905 for allowing someone else, Rose Rife, to
manage a brothel in her house. Grand Jury Charge, State v. Mary Dickerson,
Apr. 1905 (Box 133, file no. 1062) (on file with the Author and the McDowell
County Clerk’s Office); Grand Jury Charge, State v. Rose Rife, Apr. 1905
(Box 131, file no. 1102). By 1910, Rife was among four women living in the
brothel of a certain Rebecca Robertson, known madam. DEPT. OF COMMERCE
AND LABOR BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED
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early 20th century Appalachia.51 Sex workers in Nevada travel to
pursue work, and brothel employment particularly appeals to
women with seasonal obligations.52 School ends for the summer and
winter halts agriculture, thus creating opportunities for teachers,
college students, ranchers, and single moms with school-yearcustody to quickly accumulate profit through sex work.53 The steady
demand for sex incentivizes year-round sex workers to travel as
well.54 By attempting to hinder the pursuit of demand by confining
prostitution to unpopulated regions, Nevada laws yield the opposite
result: sex workers get tired of the sparse clientele and seek more
lucrative options in Las Vegas and Reno. 55 Property concepts
simply cannot keep track of this transience and, just as early West
Virginian laws failed to control prostitution in Cinder Bottom, the
law remains ineffective today. 56 If a law’s worth does not come
directly from its effect on regulated individuals, the purpose of the
law becomes the moral interests of third parties.
STATES: 1910 POPULATION, CENSUS PLACE: BROWNS CREEK, MCDOWELL,
WEST VIRGINIA, supra note 39. Completing the circle, Robertson lived next
door to Dickerson. Id. The interactions of these women are only a small piece
of a much larger and complex prostitution network, but offer a sample of how
prostitution depended on human collaboration and mobility instead of
property.
51
Interview at Bella’s Hacienda, supra note 11.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
For example, an employee at the Dove Tail Ranch makes frequent trips to
see her regular brothel clients when she has arranged a sufficient number of
appointments to justify the trip to Elko County; otherwise, she works
independently in her home city. Interview with B., Employee, The Dovetail
Ranch, in Carlin, Nev. (July 20, 2015).
55
Charles Kendrick, owner of Sharon’s Bar & Brothel, claims that prostitutes
rotate through Nevada’s brothels and cities at will in pursuit of the best work
opportunities. Interview with Charles Kendrick, Owner and Manager,
Sharon’s Bar and Brothel, in Carlin, Nev. (July 21, 2015) [hereinafter
Interview at Sharon’s Bar & Brothel].
56
As aforementioned, research for this Note entailed review of hundreds of
McDowell County indictments; both the frequency of prostitution charges as
a whole and the repetition of prostitution charges on specific individuals over
the course of years showcases the inefficiency of prior criminal regimes. See
supra notes 39 and 50.
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Travelling towards the highest demand is only one of many
economic reasons explaining why prostitution is a transient
industry. Like any other working person, sex workers consider
financial and personal benefits when making decisions about
commuting and scheduling.57 The story that best unifies financial
and personal advancement and Appalachian prostitution is the story
of Jennifer Reed of the Desiree Alliance, a sex workers’ rights
organization. 58 Jennifer grew up in Ohio near the West Virginia
border, and, after leaving an abusive relationship in her junior year
of college, she needed money to support her children and graduate
school ambitions.59 A college friend in a similar situation introduced
her to over-the-border club work in West Virginia where she could
work without fear of recognition. 60 She recalls the camaraderie
among prostitutes as women from poor areas, especially single
moms, as they tried to advance beyond their inherited situation.61
Due to the club’s location on the state border, this network provided
travel advice about safety and more prosperous venues.62
Overall, prostitutes are not anchored to property as the law
suggests. To the contrary, sex workers move using savvy costbenefit analyses that factor in time, demand, and discretion. These
57

Both S. and A., illegal sex workers in Las Vegas, are single moms who are
proud of how prostitution enables their financial independence and
involvement as parents. Interview with S., supra note 1; Interview with A., in
Las Vegas, Nev. (July 17, 2015) [hereinafter Interview with A]. As A. sees it,
she could work nine-to-five for minimum wage, earn less, and miss out on
her young son’s upbringing. Interview with A. Instead, she earns several
hundred dollars from a few appointments after dropping her son at school and
has her evening cleared for homework help. Interview with A. S. also cites
prostitution as “the best career for a single mom” for the same reason.
Interview with S, supra note 1.
58
Interview with Jennifer Reed, Ph.D. Candidate, U. of Nev. Las Vegas, in
Las Vegas, Nev. (July 18, 2015).
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Refuting the stereotype of the drug-laden Appalachian prostitution scene,
Ms. Reed states that drug incentive exists in any type of labor with a low
educational bar and addiction is not disproportionate in sex work. To the
contrary, her experience showed addicts to be the minority among prostitutes,
although that varied from club to club. Id.
62
Id.
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are the “same things we ask about other economic sectors,” yet the
law refrains from viewing prostitution as a business. 63 Not doing so
produces inaccurate laws that neglect the economic decisions
prostitutes make in the sale of sex, such as “[w]hat kind of jobs are
available, under what conditions and for what types of employers?”
and “[w]hat role do informal networks of families, friends, and
coworkers play . . . ?”64 Because these are the questions asked by
sex workers, these are the questions that the law should ask.
2. Transience of Clients
If the transience of prostitutes already exceeds the capacity
of property-centric regulation, then the transience of clients doubles
the inefficacy of the laws. Just as sex workers travel to work, clients
travel for sex. The ultimate meeting place of both parties is thus
ancillary to the economic question of how these parties move and
why.
History confirms the longstanding connection between
prostitution patronage and transience, especially in rural areas
occupied by big industries.65 Cinder Bottom “was tolerated or even
fostered by the coal companies to keep their workers happy. The
Norfolk & Western Railroad was alleged to have run special trains
for the miners’ visiting convenience.” 66 In Nevada, industries
continue to generate patrons by assembling large numbers of mobile
employees.67 The manager at the Dovetail Ranch describes a 50-50
divide between regional patrons and workers contracted to the
area. 68 Interstate 80 provides a steady supply of truck operators,
63

Willman-Navarro, supra note 20, at 20.
Id.
65
Jean Battlo, Cinder Bottom: A Coalfields Red-Light District, 20
GOLDENSEAL 60, 62 (1994).
66
Id.
67
Mr. Kendrick calls the mines the “golden opportunity” that enabled his
business. The mines were expanding at the onset of Sharon’s Bar and Brothel,
and the well-paid, around-the-clock workforce of miners guaranteed a return
on his licensing and building expenses. He paid off all costs in just three years.
Interview at Sharon’s Bar and Brothel, supra note 55.
68
Interview with Monica, Manager, The Dovetail Ranch, in Carlin, Nev.
(July 21, 2015) [hereinafter interview at Dovetail].
64
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while the gold mines bring in miners, especially during the yearly
deconstruction and reassembly of the mills.69
The transience of brothel clients is not unknown to the law.
At Bella’s Hacienda, management estimates that 70% of clients are
truck drivers. 70 City code mandates that “[a]ll soliciting of
prostitution and acts of prostitution must take place inside the house
of prostitution of a licensed brothel.” 71 This de facto means that
prostitutes cannot personally solicit, or even leave ads, at truck
stops.72 However, using a billboard on the brothel property itself or
a citizens band (“CB”) radio to attract truck drivers is perfectly
allowable.73 In this way, prostitution laws subtly acknowledge and
accommodate the transience of patrons because advertising
restrictions would suffocate business if not for a mobile clientele.
Yet the laws stifle the brothels’ ability to truly capitalize on this
trend.
In modern day McDowell County, the red-light reign of
Cinder Bottom is long gone. Instead, a small number of prostitutes
solicit in Welch, McDowell’s largest city of about 3,000 people.74
The Author first encountered Welch’s sex workers when two
women introduced themselves in a parking garage. 75 The women
did not share the Author’s favorable view of their town, insisting
that there was “nothing to do,” especially without a car.76 “We walk
everywhere,” one woman said, complaining that even the nearest

69

Id.
Interview at Bella’s Hacienda, supra note 11.
71
WELLS, NEV., CITY CODE ch. 6, tit. 3-6-5(B), (2001).
72
Bella’s employees take shifts advertising over CB, although this practice is
decreasing with the rise of online advertising. However, Bella’s still has a
table where employees broadcast messages to prospective clients, and all
brothels generally have bright signs that can be seen from the roadway.
Bella’s Hacienda, supra note 11.
73
The city advertising restrictions that govern the Dove Tail and Sharon’s are
essentially the same as those applicable to Bella’s in Wells, NV. CARLIN,
NEV., CITY CODE ch. 9, tit. 5-9-4(B), (1991).
74
David Grubb, WELCOME TO MCDOWELL COUNTY, WV,
http://mcdowellwv.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2015).
75
Anonymous Interview, in Welch, W. Va. (July 2015).
76
Id.
70
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fast food was out of reach.77 Eventually a client arrived, parked, and
the women entered his truck, thus illustrating the biggest difference
between modern prostitution in Nevada and McDowell County;
transience defines the client, not the prostitute.
Of course, transience is relative. Prostitutes in Southern
West Virginia indeed move via streetwalking, however, the
mobility prostitutes gain by streetwalking is minimal compared to
that of clients. In Welch, the identities of the several local
prostitutes, as well as the street on which they solicit, are well
known. 78 Out-of-state contractors, as well as workers from other
parts of the state, come to Welch to flag prostitutes.79 Repeat clients
and locals thus know where to find their prostitution supply, but
prostitutes do not have similar opportunity to move towards
demand. 80
The unilateral transience of Appalachian prostitution creates
a two-fold problem. First, prostitution remains sufficiently transient
through streetwalking and travelling clients to make propertycentric criminal laws inapplicable. Second, the unequal access to
travel between Appalachian sex workers and clients creates unequal
bargaining power because sex workers rely on the demand for sex
coming to them.81 If obtaining a cheeseburger requires overcoming
distance, then getting to the most lucrative place to sell sex is
impossible. Accordingly, an Appalachian sex worker receives far
less than her rural Nevada counterpart because of a market
stalemate: the expected rate for services is $15-25, and she cannot

77

Id.
Welch attorney Mr. Barie describes the number of prostitutes as a
“handful.” Interview with Danny Barie, Attorney, in Welch, W. Va. (July 8,
2015). Welch attorney Mr. Hassan approximates this number at about five.
Interview with Ron Hassan, Attorney, in Welch, W. Va. (July 8, 2015).
79
Interview with Martin West, Sheriff, McDowell County Sheriff’s Office, in
Welch, W. Va. (July 2015). Attorney Barie confirms the high proportion of
contracted workers among prostitution clients. Interview with Danny Barie,
supra note 78.
80
Id.
81
See Pruitt, supra notes 27–28 (explaining the limitations Appalachian
women generally face in accessing transportation and overcoming poverty);
Anonymous Interview, supra note 75.
78
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increase demand by leaving.82 Compare that number to the average
rate of $365 for a “party” with a “rural” Nevada brothel worker.83
Even the minimum price for rural Nevada brothel workers began at
$100 from 2011–2013, and that range extended to $1500.84
As one scholar remarked in relation to domestic violence,
“[t]he point is not that rural women are worse off than their urban
or suburban counterparts; it is that their spatial circumstances and
the consequences of those circumstances are relevant. . . including
the law’s response to [them].” 85 In Appalachia, the relevant
circumstance is that prostitution remains undaunted by criminal
prohibitions. 86 However, the diminished transience of prostitutes
compared to clients limits how much a prostitute can gain. Criminal
law responds only to the question of if and where prostitution
happens.87 The better question is: when prostitution does happen,
how do the involved parties shape the exchange? Economics
answers this question.
B. Emphasis on Ownership
Criminal prostitution laws suffer from a second enormous
misconception. Property-centrism ignores the transience of
82

Rates were obtained by asking a small survey of local men. Anonymous
Interview, in McDowell County, W.Va. (July 2015).
83
Sex-In-Nevada’s Ongoing Pricing Survey Results for Years 2011 through
2013,
SEX-IN-NEVADA.COM,
http://www.sex-innevada.com/Bashful/SURVEYS/price_2011_2013.pdf (last visited Jan. 31,
2016).
84
Id.
85
Pruitt, supra note 27, at 355–56.
86
Erin Beck, Prostitution Persists Despite Police Efforts, CHARLESTON
GAZETTE-MAIL
(Sept.
7,
2015),
http://www.wvgazettemail.com/article/20150907/gz01/150909607.
87
See Ave Mince-Didier, Prostitution, Pimping, and Pandering Laws in West
Virginia,
CRIMINAL
DEFENSE
LAWYER,
http://www.criminaldefenselawyer.com/resources/criminal-defense/statecrime/pandering-laws-west-virginia.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2017)
(outlining the relevant prostitution laws in West Virginia and their associated
penalties. Like most criminal laws, the state uses jail time and fines to
retroactively punish prohibited conduct).

SPINDLER: RETHINKING RED LIGHTS: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO APPALACHIAN PROSTITUTION LAWS

82

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & LAW

[Vol. VII: II

prostitution, but also targets the wrong individual: the property
owner. 88 In both Nevada and West Virginia, property owners are
liable for prostitution occurring on their land. 89 In turn, the law
punishes owners with injunctions and taxes, alongside conventional
punishment like fines and imprisonment.90 Directing the law’s force
towards property owners is not only ineffective because of the
detachment between prostitution and location, but ownership is a
weak conduit for regulation because managers—not owners—
organize prostitution. 91 Management oversees the employment
conditions of sex workers, frequently including fee allocation. 92
Money is the driving force of prostitution, making the role of
managers more influential than that of a property owner in shaping
an area’s prostitution. In turn, an effective prostitution law
understands the importance of management and shifts regulatory
focus to management’s control over sex workers.
1. Management and Money
Prostitution in a legal or illegal business structure has a form
of management that directs prostitutes and their work. In Las Vegas,
illegal sex workers often seek escort agency employment to avoid
the financial and physical risks of working independently.93 Escort
agencies are wholly separate from property ownership because
88

See supra notes 34 and 35 for a list of West Virginia and Nevada
prostitution laws related to the property owner’s culpability.
89
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-5(a); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.200 (“Any
person who shall keep any disorderly house . . . is guilty of a misdemeanor”).
90
West Virginia law allows ownership of a prostitution locale to be fined
between $100-$250; subsequent offenses lead to between 1–5 years
imprisonment. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-5(a). Injunction based on
ownership is likewise available. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-9-2. Maintaining a
nuisance due to prostitution also allows a $300 tax against the owner. W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 61-9-9. In Nevada, illegal ownership of a place of prostitution
results in a misdemeanor; however, a second violation within three years
results in a fine between $250-$1000 and 1–6 months in jail. NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 207.030.
91
Interview at Dovetail, supra note 68.
92
Id.
93
Interview with S., supra note 1; Interview with A., supra note 57.
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agencies do not host sexual exchanges; instead, management
arranges appointments, thereby saving sex workers time otherwise
spent soliciting and communicating with potential clients. 94
Potential clients frequently get cold feet, so the secured clientele
provided by agencies is cost-efficient. 95 Accordingly, agency
employment would seem like a sweet deal: so why do so many
prostitutes choose to work independently?
The answer lies in the agencies’ fee-splitting arrangement,
which tilts a sex workers’ cost-benefit analysis in favor of
independent work.96 A. explained that the agency first lays claim to
its arrangement fee, then splits the sex worker’s tip: a $300 total
thus portions out to only $160 of earnings.97 Similarly, S. described
a $200 total of which the agency receives the majority.98 For sex
workers who logically prioritize retaining their profits, managerial
control over finances in brothels has the same dissuasive effect as
escort agencies. In fairness, brothel laws make it difficult for a
small, independent business to break even.99 Brothels pay a license
94

Interview with S., supra note 1; Interview with A., supra note 57.
A. estimates that she gets eight calls a night, only two of which are
legitimate. If she can identify unserious inquiries at the onset, she is lucky:
she cites the biggest downside of prostitution as driving somewhere when no
one shows up. These unprofitable hours cost her gas money and time away
from home. Agencies can “book more people” and quickly replace a no-show.
Interview with A., supra note 57.
96
Three sex workers interviewed for this Note talked about their agency
experience, and each cited unfair pay as the reason for seeking employment
elsewhere, stating, “they take all of your money, but you do all the work.”
Interview with S., supra note 1; Interview with A., supra note 57; Interview
with B., supra note 54.
97
This total includes a tip, some clients—having paid the agency fee—are
upset to discover tips are expected. Interview with A., supra note 57.
98
She then called this a “false rate” because, upon meeting the client, the
agency instructs employees to state that the $200 is “just to get me naked.” S.
began instructing clients to call the agency to cancel their appointment,
whereupon she would personally charge a fair rate. Interview with S., supra
note 1.
99
According to Mr. Kendrick, initial approval requires paying for a FBI and
Nevada Investigative Division background check; he then pays up to $50,000
per year for license renewal. Interview at Sharon’s Bar & Brothel, supra note
55.
95
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fee “for the privilege of operating a house of prostitution”
determined by a “prostitution licensing and control board”
composed of city councilmen. 100 Advertising restrictions further
impair the ability to attract clientele,101 forcing the already isolated
brothels to rely on word-of-mouth. Ultimately, prostitutes bear
much of the cost of these financially restrictive laws because, in
addition to paying for their own lodging in the brothel, they must
pay for weekly health examinations 102 and a sheriff’s card. 103
Finally, a brothel employee personally negotiates with a client about
the lump proceeds from a transaction but then splits this amount and
tips with the brothel.104 Overall, it comes as no surprise that most
Nevada prostitutes choose illegal work when the laws and
managerial scheme of legal brothels combine to so severely restrict
income. 105
2. Management and Employment Conditions
There are aspects to brothel management beyond strict
finances that influence the employment choices of prostitutes.
Approaches to brothel management vary tremendously and,
because brothel workers live in the brothels, the conditions created
by management are a primary determinant when considering where

100

CARLIN, NEV., CITY CODE ch. 9, tit. 5-9-6 and 5-9-13 (1991). WELLS,
NEV., CITY CODE ch. 6, tit. 3-6-6 and 3-6-15 (2001).
101
See supra notes 72 and 73 for city advertising prohibitions.
102
CARLIN, NEV., CITY CODE ch. 9, tit. 5-9-15 (1991). WELLS, NEV., CITY
CODE ch. 6, tit. 3-6-25 (2001).
103
CARLIN, NEV., CITY CODE ch. 9, tit. 5-9-14 (1991). WELLS, NEV., CITY
CODE ch. 6, tit. 3-6-26 (2001).
104
While workers at the Dovetail keep all tips earned by dancing at the bar,
tips from sex work are still split with the brothel. Interview at Dovetail, supra
note 68.
105
David Knowles, A Bad Economy and Independent Prostitutes Running
Nevada Brothels Out of Business, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS (May 10, 2013),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/bad-economy-shutting-nevadabrothels-article-1.1340972.
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to work.106 At Bella’s Hacienda, the assistant manager revealed the
key to her approach: separating her “personal life and brothel
life.” 107 Too much fraternization with employees, she explained,
gives the illusion of favoritism and creates tension.108 In contrast,
the Dovetail shift manager and manager lauded the family
atmosphere, claiming the sex workers and management form a
family.109
The employee environment also depends on the extent to
which management enforces the city’s prostitution restrictions,
which impose surprising restraints on a sex worker’s liberty. For
example, Dovetail workers are under a 7 p.m. curfew after which
they cannot be in public; the regulations governing Bella’s set the
curfew at 5 p.m. 110 Bella’s management actively enforces this
curfew because police will suspend or revoke the brothel’s license
for violations. 111 By comparison, the Dove Tail curfew is more
lenient, largely because of the accepting community attitude.112 A
Dove Tail employee explained that being spotted with a client past
curfew might draw negative attention, but no one cares if a sex
worker leaves to purchase snacks at the gas station.113 Likewise, the
Dovetail manager does not make employees contract, meaning
106

Interviewing brothel management, as well as past and current employees,
highlights the various management styles in place—as well as the response
of those subject to management. Infra notes 107-119.
107
Interview at Bella’s Hacienda, supra note 11
108
Id.
109
Interview at Dovetail, supra note 68.
110
Interview at Bella’s Hacienda, supra note 11; Interview at Dovetail, supra
note 68; See also Bella Mansfield, Nevada’s Brothels: Legalization Serves
the Man, TITSANDSASS.COM (April 22, 2014), http://titsandsass.com/nevadasbrothels-legalization-serves-the-man/ (“In addition to state and county
regulations, each brothel has its own set of rules. These rules aren’t available
to the public . . . Should [sex workers] need something, like a toothbrush or a
box of tampons, they must pay a fee to a house runner who will pick up these
items for her . . . If they leave, they must return by a set curfew.”).
111
In actuality, prostitutes are not supposed to be in town whatsoever,
regardless of curfew. Local women cannot work at the brothels, and sex
workers must take their days off in other towns. Interview at Bella’s
Hacienda, supra note 11.
112
Interview at Dovetail, supra note 68.
113
Interview with B., supra note 54.
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prostitutes may leave whenever they choose.114
Still, sex workers cannot avoid offensive employment
conditions simply by working outside of brothels. S. described
several unpleasant practices put in place by escort agency
management, such as refusing to use a prostitute’s real photo in
advertisements.115 Instead, clients pick from postings of airbrushed,
idealized women; agencies then send the sex worker who best
matches the image.116 Sometimes this practice goes horribly wrong;
such encounters are not only embarrassing, but S. also resents taking
part in a sales practice that actively “lies to people.”117
Ultimately, the variance in management strategies means
that sex workers often make the difficult choice between high
profits and fair treatment.118 The different approaches to sex work
management are therefore much more indicative than land
ownership with regards to where prostitution occurs. Accordingly,
treating prostitution more like a business, rather than a locationbased offense, creates accurate laws that consider the importance of
the managerial level.
3. Management and the Law
Given management’s hefty influence over an area’s
prostitution, placing accountability on the property owner makes
little sense. If the manager and owner happen to be the same person,
this is a happy coincidence for the law; however, it is rarely the

114

The manager’s lenient attitude developed from watching management at
the larger brothels, where madams refused to let employees leave, demeaned
and even fired sex workers in front of clients, alongside other abusive
practices. For this reason, large brothels—sometimes called “pussy
prisons”—have a more constrictive reputation. Interview at Dovetail, supra
note 68.
115
Interview with S., supra note 1.
116
Id.
117
S. described a particularly embarrassing incident in which her agency
matched her with a client who requested a woman of a different race. Another
time, a client called S. out for having the opposite body type to that depicted
in his selected photo. Id.
118
Interview at Dovetail, supra note 68.

DEPAUL J. WOMEN GEN & L.

2017]

DEPAUL J. WOMEN, GEN & L.

VOLUME 6, NUMBER II

87

case.119 As scholar and activist Jennifer Reed puts it, the emphasized
role of the brothel aids a male-dominated economic dichotomy in
which an illusion is created that—absent the owner’s input—the
essential business tactics of booking, marketing and advertising are
impossible.120 However, management is a vital pillar of sex work;
this is as true today as it was in early twentieth century
Appalachia.121
Returning to Cinder Bottom, while brothel owners remained
mysterious, the madams were well known authority figures. 122
Indeed, indictments from the time charge madams for “keep[ing]
and maintain[ing]”—not owning—a house of ill fame, showing that
the law linked responsibility for prostitution with the managerial
level.123 In fact, many Cinder Bottom madams are listed as househeads and boardinghouse proprietresses in the census, 124 but
assuming that the most influential figure in a brothel is also the
owner is problematic because of the interplay between madams and
owners in compact red light districts.125 It is this aspect of influence,
119

The Dove Tail manager cites attempts by brothel owners to also function
as effective managers in partial explanation for why Nevada brothels
frequently close and re-open. Management and ownership are simply two
very different creatures, thus the common brothel structure comprises a male
owner and a female manager who “knows how to handle” employees.
Dovetail, supra note 68.
120
Interview with Jennifer Reed, supra note 58.
121
See supra note 50 (describing the way in which several, central madams
coordinated the prostitution of Cinder Bottom; the indictments of these sex
workers shows long-term affiliations with certain madams, mirroring the way
that modern sex workers choose their place of employment with management
in mind.).
122
In Attorney General Lee’s 1911 visit to Cinder Bottom, he asks the police
chief, “Chief, at the first house, you mentioned collecting the rent. Who owns
these dives?” The chief had openly collected rent from the madam in clear
indication of her authorized control over the brothel. However, the identity of
the owner “is a matter that is never discussed.” LEE, supra note 38, at 205.
123
DEPT. OF COMMERCE AND LABOR BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THIRTEENTH
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1910 POPULATION, CENSUS PLACE:
BROWNS CREEK, MCDOWELL, WEST VIRGINIA, supra note 39.
124
Id.
125
For example, Mary Dickerson and Rose Rife were both independently
charged as madams in their time, yet Mary Dickerson “unlawfully and
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usually delegated to the madam, that creates so much confusion
regarding prostitution laws that focus on property owners. Ella
Kelso—yet another prolific Cinder Bottom madam—was not the
owner of the house of ill fame she was charged for keeping in 1910,
and thus the jury instructions accompanying her charge reveal the
weakness of the law’s association between prostitution control and
land ownership. Kelso’s liability hinged on undoing this
association:
[i]f you believe from the evidence in this case that
Ella Kelso the defendant had charge of the
house . . . you should find her guilty as charged in
the indictment although you may believe she had
sold her furniture and had no interest in the rents
except to collect them as the agent of the owner.126
A sustained version of this instruction further states that Kelso’s
liability rested on whether she “had control, managed or exercised
some position of authority over the house in question,” thereby
recognizing the actual power held by management.127
The state’s description of Kelso’s influence as a madam
remarkably parallels current municipal law in Nevada. The city of
Wells, unlike its neighbor city of Carlin, requires “key employees”
to register for a sheriff’s license. 128 A key employee is “[a]ny
executive, employee or agent of a licensed house of prostitution
having the power to exercise a significant influence over decisions
concerning any part of the house of prostitution.”129 Furthermore,
status as a key employee is not “restricted by the title of the job
performed or amount of compensation received, but shall consider
the functions, responsibilities and apparent decision making
knowingly permit[ted] a house owned by her and under her control to be used
and kept by one Rose Rife as a house of ill-fame.” State v. Dickerson, supra
note 50.
126
Jury Instructions, State v. Ella Kelsaw, May 1910 (Box 150, file no. 2096)
(emphasis added).
127
Id. (emphasis added).
128
WELLS, NEV., CITY CODE ch. 6, tit. 3-6-20.
129
Id. (emphasis added).
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authority of the person involved.” 130 Overall, prostitution laws
demonstrate significant contradiction. One one had, the statutory
language delegates liability to the property owner. However, on a
micro level, jury instructions and municipal enforcement are
adjusted to suit the reality of how prostitution really works: through
nuanced levels of management. Accordingly, Appalachian
prostitution laws are better served by recognizing the realistic
control of management over prostitution versus the guilty, yet
phantom, owner.
This transition would accurately reflect what West Virginian
law already knows: a tier of managers exists between sex workers
and property owners. State law explains that if “with reasonable
care and diligence such owner could not have known” about
prostitution based nuisance, the owner avoids punishment if the
court is “satisfied of the good faith of the owner of real or personal
property and of his innocence of any knowledge of the use of such
property as a nuisance.” 131 While this provision appears to
acknowledge that owners may be detached from prostitution
altogether, it stands in stark contradiction to legal assumptions
within the same article:
When such nuisance has been found to exist . . . and
the owner or agent of such place . . . was not a party
to the proceeding and has not appeared therein, the
tax of three hundred dollars shall, nevertheless, be
imposed . . . The person in whose name the real
estate affected by the action stands on the land books
of the county for purposes of taxation shall be
presumed to be the owner thereof, and in case of
unknown persons . . . such may be made parties.132
Of course, this law makes sense in considering that, when a
nuisance occurs, someone has to pay – it might as well be the
property owner. However, in light of prostitution’s status as a
nuisance, the net effect is that wholly unknown persons can be
accountable for prostitution. In the grandest legal fiction of all, the
130

Id. (emphasis added).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-9-4.
132
§ 61-9-10.
131
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state delegates responsibility for two bodies exchanging sex for
money to the trustee of the land on which it happens.
III.

RECONCILING THE ECONOMY AND REALITY THROUGH A
PARENT-SUBSIDIARY MODEL

Overall, legalizing prostitution requires reconciling two
interests: a sex worker’s financial interest and the state’s interest in
control. Prostitutes will not comply with laws that unduly restrict
their earnings.133 Yet, realistically, no state will concede to laws that
allow unbridled prostitution. In this regard, legal brothels satisfy
state control by funneling prostitution into fixed establishments
subject to business regulations. The Author initially resisted
supporting the brothel scheme because it goes against the desires of
independent sex workers who understandably resent profit sharing.
However, the fact that both S. and A., along with interviewed
brothel employees, began their careers in agencies is telling. These
women were not initially opposed to working for firms, but
economic and managerial impositions dissuaded them. 134 If laws
made employment for a business more appealing by providing the
freedom that sex workers need to maximize their profits, states
could still retain adequate oversight. Legalizing prostitution in a
way that encourages a parent-subsidiary model holds potential as a
solution because, unlike current American approaches, it accounts
for the key aspects of transience and management.
A. Parent-Subsidiary Corporations and How They Work
for Prostitution
The parent-subsidiary structure allows for control at the state
and local level by the nature of its structure. “A partly owned
subsidiary corporation is a corporation in which the parent company
owns a majority of the subsidiary's voting shares, or at least enough
shares to give the parent effective control of the subsidiary, but in
which some of the subsidiary's shares are owned by other
133
134

Interview with S., supra note 1; Interview with A., supra note 57.
Id.
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holders.” 135 While the parent corporation, through its shareholder
majority, has authority over subsidiaries, the two are independent
entities.136 As such, both the parent and subsidiary are bound to the
laws of their respective states.137 Should states choose to draft laws
similar to those of Nevada in legalizing brothels, each state would
naturally draft laws different than those of others. Accordingly, the
state exercises control because the daily operations of that
subsidiary brothel must conform to state laws even if the parent
head is elsewhere. A county can furthermore design its own brothel
codes, such as Elko County currently does in Nevada, so long as
those codes conform to state law.
So how would a parent-subsidiary structure work for legal
prostitution? To begin, prostitution would need to be legalized at
the state level. Importantly, in Nevada counties with legal
prostitution, no prohibition exists against corporations applying for
brothel ownership. 138 However, the realities of county-specific
legalization make corporate establishment unfeasible. To begin,
“[e]stablishing a subsidiary is an expensive undertaking,” and the
laws specifically confine brothels to counties that do not have heavy
clientele. 139 Furthermore, the county-specific nature of brothel
codes means that community members have the favor of city
councilmen in receiving license grants.140 If a state as a whole, or
135
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even several states, legalized prostitution, then a broader corporate
scheme could arise.
Sex workers in Nevada are currently considered
independent workers, 141 which could continue under a parentsubsidiary structure. This satisfies the transience of prostitution by
maintaining the current Nevada practice, whereby legal brothel
employees hop from brothel to brothel for a desired period of time
in pursuit of demand. The transience of clients is likewise
accommodated because a different location can be tailored for
“those [that] normally serve small towns . . . [and] cities crammed
with potential customers.” 142 Reflecting on the need-specific
strategies of S., this means amenities for party-seeking clients in
large cities, like outdates and arrangements with nearby resort
casinos, while rural brothels cater to discretion, intimacy, and the
fluctuations of seasonal laborers.
The difference created by a parent-subsidiary model is the
existence of an overarching corporate policy. 143 The parent head
should not necessarily be a brothel, but an administrative center that
“handle[s] the administration of a company, while the branch
locations” as brothels “operate the business,” which “lets both sides
do what they do best.”144 This system provides for a higher chance
of a brothel’s success because brothel managers can focus on the
women in town had known me since I was twelve, and Sharon since she was
a baby. The women went to the city council and said ‘if anyone is going to do
this, let it at least be Charles and Sharon.’” Interview at Sharon’s Bar and
Brothel, supra note 55.
141
As explained in the “FAQ” section of the Dove Tail website, “We do not
have set rates for sexual activities. The ladies are independent contractors,
and as such they set their own rates for various activities.” THE DOVETAIL
RANCH, www.thedovetailranch.com (last visited Jan. 31, 2016).
142
More Bang for Your Buck, supra note 49.
143
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CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/relationship-between-company-itssubsidiary-14696.html. (last visited Nov. 25, 2015) (“The parent corporation
organizes the subsidiary’s management structure and company bylaws,
setting forth rules related to corporate governance.”).
144
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well-being and efficiency of employees, while corporate directors
can allocate resources and devise strategies for the success of the
business. Nevada brothels often close,145 which management at the
Dove Tail attributes to poor managerial approaches—specifically,
owners trying to take on the managerial role.146 The corporate rules
set forth by the parent head can thus make determinations about
overarching business strategies while maintaining the important and
independent role of management. The parent’s broad management
standards would ideally eliminate unacceptable or unfair
managerial strategies, but brothels can then fine-tune policies
according to the specific preferences of clientele and employees.
For instance, sex workers can choose between the Dove Tail’s
family atmosphere or the more structured approach of Bella’s
establishment.
Increased profitability is another important upside of the
parent-subsidiary scheme, which is vital to legalized prostitution
because there is no appeal for sex workers to work for an
unprofitable business. A parent-subsidiary arrangement allows for
several profitable devices. To begin, parent companies are usually
not responsible for the debt or liability of subsidiaries, thus the
business as a whole can survive if one location fails. Considering
the tendency of brothels to close—should one brothel fall into
financial ruin—the other subsidiaries are shielded from that
downfall and can continue operation. 147 Sex workers thus have
security about maintaining employment options.
Future brothel subsidies would also gain revenue through
“cost synergies . . . because a parent and its subsidiary could use
common financial systems, share administrative services and
develop joint marketing programs.” 148 Specifically, “[o]perating
synergies affect the operations of the combined firm and include
economies of scale, increasing pricing power and higher growth
potential.” 149 By combining corporate efforts and resources, the
145
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brothels could save on expenses while increasing profits. 150 This
increase could, in turn, be used to offset some of the operating costs
that get placed on sex workers themselves, like boarding, medical
tests, and sheriff’s licenses. Furthermore, a more profitable brothel
can reduce the percentage it takes from prostitutes’ earnings. The
net result is a higher likelihood of sex workers to seek brothel
employment because they can avail themselves of the clientele of a
lucrative business while retaining more income.
Finally, legalizing prostitution in a corporate context
enables private law to help the industry address losses. As a
business, brothels can use contract law to clarify expectations about
the sale of sex. A client can therefore still be obligated to pay if that
client fails to show up or cancels last minute, resolving the
frustration that independent workers expressed about the high rate
of no-shows. By establishing payment guidelines, a client cannot
claim unawareness about tips;151 a minimum rate also ensures that
sex workers who are less skilled at negotiation will not grossly
undercharge. Payment failure can be countered by breach of
contract claims, and a large corporation’s visibility (1) disinclines
clients from not paying initially; and (2) provides means for the
subsidiary brothel to go after those who do.152
In terms of safety, private law would perhaps increase
150
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judicial oversight of prostitution. The availability of tort claims
means that sex workers and clients alike can file claims for assault,
battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
illegality of prostitution makes it unlikely such injuries will ever get
reported. Even in Nevada, because prostitution is not legal statewide, Mr. Kendrick decrees that the “attorney general will never
discuss prostitution; you will be deferred to local prosecutors or the
county sheriff.” 153 Availing prostitution of private law not only
removes the industry from the underground, but an injured party can
receive restitution for a tort claim. All parties involved are likely to
tread more carefully when failure to do so can cost money. Finally,
encouraging corporate prostitution does not preclude the criminal
justice system: a brothel, like any other business, can call on the
police for robberies or violence.
B. Application of Parent-Subsidiary Prostitution to Appalachia
Simple numbers show why there is a dire need for the
parent-subsidiary approach to prostitution in Appalachia. Again,
different sexual acts fall within a range of $15-$25 in Welch,
McDowell County. 154 A rural brothel worker in Nevada has an
average rate of $365. Nevada is known for prostitution.
Appalachian sex workers could not initially expect the same
payment range because of the differences in the economy and
demand. However, prostitution uncontestably exists in Southern
West Virginia and, with corporate oversight, the gap between $15
and $365 could close. This oversight could exist through a parent
head’s establishment of minimum wage or a corporate-wide
adherence to fixed prices for certain services so that sex workers do
not undercharge or get haggled out of fair pay. “Greater pricing
power from reduced competition” is among the operating synergy
benefits to a parent-subsidiary structure.155 When other prostitutes
accept less money in the same area, a likely scenario considering
Appalachia’s high poverty rate, overall prices are pushed down.156
Yet because only a few prostitutes work in a small West Virginian
153
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town like Welch, the plausibility of keeping prices high by
employing all, if not the majority, of an area’s sex workers is greater
than in a large city.
Adequate compensation does not bind a sex worker to
prostitution forever; to the contrary, it may be the financial boost
needed to overcome rural “[o]bstacles to economic selfsufficiency . . . [and] social norms that discourage [women] from
developing human capital, as well as the practical difficulties
associated with doing so.” 157 The Welch prostitutes expressed
frustration that, without transportation, they are trapped by their
poverty.158 Their community knows them and has granted de facto
permission for their work; they will continue working. This Note
does not assume that, given adequate compensation, they would
seize the chance to purchase a car and drive towards a different life,
but they should at least be given that chance. If the state of West
Virginia legalized prostitution, such women could then, as
independent contractors, find the same employment with the same
corporation in a larger city brothel. For instance, Charleston, the
state capitol, or the university city of Morgantown, present fewer
obstructions to a rural woman’s success: scarce options for housing,
employment, child care, job training services, and community
college. 159 Sex workers availed of a parent-subsidiary’s multiple
locations can follow the footsteps of Jennifer Reed by accumulating
revenue in higher demand areas to fund their goals.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Overall, American economics need to guide this country’s
legal stance on prostitution instead of morals or European models.
This approach is especially pivotal in Appalachia, where the
regional economy deserves and requires special attention that
cannot be achieved through blanket policies. Without viewing
prostitution as a business, the governing law remains impotent and
Appalachian sex workers continue to receive payment that is
inadequate to overcome poverty. By comparison, economics
promotes laws that are both effective and actually relevant to sex
157
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work participants.
Luckily, examining the past and present circumstances of
rural prostitution illustrates more than longstanding regulatory
failure: important aspects on which the law can hone are also
revealed. The reality of sex work in Nevada and West Virginia
clarifies that financial influences, like transience and management,
have more sway over prostitution than property notions. Business
law can better address these factors because allowing prostitution
under private law balances the state’s interest in control and a sex
workers’ interest in capitalizing. A parent-subsidiary structure
satisfies these interests by ensuring a brothel’s compliance with
state laws while enabling sex workers to pursue demand and
favorable employment conditions. Finally, prostitution can be
profitable using a parent-subsidiary model, which is vital not only
to the success of effective laws, but also rural women. Unless the
law lets sex workers make an adequate income, it will not be abided.
Without an adequate income, prostitutes in Appalachia may never
have the chance to rise above poverty.

